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Note
A Constitutional Response to the Realities of
Intimate Violence: Minnesota's Domestic
Homicide Statute
Margaret C. Hobday
The overwhelming problem of domestic violence in the
United States demands a vigorous response.1 Throughout his-
tory, society has largely ignored domestic abuse due to the tradi-
tional view that violence in the home constitutes a "private
matter."2 The feminist movement of the early 1970s challenged
1. Estimates vary as to the frequency of incidents of domestic abuse, but
all reports indicate pervasive violence. Police reports document that in 1991,
21,000 women reported domestic crimes each week. Senator Joseph R. Biden,
Jr., Chairman, Introduction to MAaoRurY STAFF OF THE SENATE JUDICI1,RY CoM-
MrTTEE, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE
OF AMERICA ii, ix (1992) [hereinafter A WEEK IN THE LIFE]. A woman has be-
tween a one-in-five and a one-in-three chance of being physically assaulted by a
partner or ex-partner during her lifetime. Surgeon General Antonio Novello,
From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Services, 267 JAMA 3132, 3185
(1992). Due to numerous factors, including poor record-keeping and failure to
report, the number of officially reported domestic abuse incidents falls short of
the actual number of incidents. EvE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DomrSTIC
VIOLENCE: THE CRIMNAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 20-22 (1991). Experts estimate
that domestic violence, both reported and unreported, affects as many as four
million women a year. Women and Violence, Hearings on S. 2754 Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 117 (1990) (testimony
of Dr. Angela Browne, Professor, Dep't of Psychiatry, Univ. of Massachusetts).
Many domestic assaults involve extreme violence. According to one estimate,
39% of all violent attacks on wives were serious, involving punching, kicking,
biting, beatings, and attacks with knives and guns. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra
at 20 (citing M.A. STRAus & R.J. GELLES, THE NATIONAL FAMILY VIOLENCE RE-
suRvEY (1988)).
2. See Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth:
Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies From Understanding the Dynamics
of Abusive Relationships, 15 HIIA n- L. REV. 115, 121-22 (1991); see also Ber-
nadette Dunn Sewell, Note, History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial and Legislative
Responses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 983, 983-97
(1989) (commenting that wife-beating was legally acceptable until the nine-
teenth century). Sewell concludes that wife-beating continues despite reform
because "the historical abuse of women is ingrained in contemporary social atti-
tudes and reflected in institutional responses to battered women." Id. at 984;
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the official neglect of domestic violence3 and exposed its devas-
tating effects. 4 In recent years, heightened awareness of domes-
tic violence has inspired significant legislative proposals and
reform.5 Unfortunately, the epidemic of violence has not
abated-abusive partners continue to beat their "loved ones" to
death.6
This Note examines a unique legislative response to domes-
tic violence-Minnesota's new first degree murder statute,
which does not require either premeditation or specific intent to
kill.7 Instead, the new statute, commonly referred to as the "do-
mestic homicide statute," presumes intent based on a number of
see also BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 1, at 23-26 (summarizing the criminal
justice system's historical responses, or lack thereof, to domestic violence).
3. For an in-depth examination of the battered women's movement in this
country, see SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATrERED WoMENs'S MovEMENT 214 (1982).
4. Not only does domestic violence affect its immediate targets, but it also
affects those who witness it, particularly the children of abusive partners: do-
mestic violence "leave[s] a legacy of violence in children that will be replayed in
their lives and relationships." A WEEK IN THE LIFE, supra note 1, at 9; see
BUZAwA & BUZAwA, supra note 1, at 17-18 (presenting the "violence-begets-vio-
lence" theory of domestic abuse).
5. For a detailed discussion of recent changes in the criminal justice sys-
tem, see BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 1. Legislative reform has primarily
concentrated on three areas: police response, handling of reported cases, and
public education. Id. at 12; see Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to
Domestic Violence, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1498, 1506-20 (1993) [hereinafter Legal
Responses] (discussing common governmental responses to woman battering
shelters and other support services, civil protection orders, and criminal
prosecution).
In 1984, Congress approved federal legislation to aid victims of domestic
violence. Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-
10412 (1988); Victims of Crime Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10605 (1988). Both the
Senate and the House of Representatives recently passed versions of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act of 1993. H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993); H.R.
3355 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993). Minnesota maintains a progressive statutory
scheme in the area of domestic violence. See Asmus et al., supra note 2, at 124-
30 (discussing "Minnesota's Response"); id. at 126-27 n. 63 (listing specific Min-
nesota statutes relating to domestic abuse).
6. One study indicates that of the 12,582 women age eighteen or older
killed in one-on-one homicides during 1980-1984, 52% were killed by either a
husband, ex-husband, common law husband, or boyfriend. BUZAwA & BUZAwA,
supra note 1, at 20 (citing D.C. Carmody & KR. Williams, Wife Assault and
Perception of Sanctions, 2(1) VIOLENCE AND ViCTims 25-39 (1987)). Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation statistics indicate that at least 1,430 women were killed in
1991 by either their husbands or their boyfriends. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI-
GATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFoRm CRIME REPORTS 19 (1991); see also
LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 212-46 (1992)
(discussing what he calls the "chronic cases" of domestic abuse, in which the
abuse ends in death).
7. MINN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (Supp. 1994).
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factors, including the victim-defendant relationship and the de-
fendant's repeated abuse of the victim." Although "domestic
abuse" encompasses a broad range of abusive relationships, 9
this Note focuses primarily on the abuse men inflict on their fe-
male intimate partners. This Note's limited focus does not in-
tend to perpetuate gender stereotypes; rather, its gender
specificity reflects the disproportionate amount of violence
against women in intimate relationships.' 0
Since the domestic homicide statute's enactment in 1990,
Minnesota has charged very few defendants under it, perhaps
because its constitutionality remains unsettled.1 ' In fact, in
every case prosecuted under the statute thus far, the defense
has requested dismissal of the charge and challenged, albeit un-
8. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 20 (outlining the statute's four
elements).
9. "Domestic abuse" includes parental abuse of a child, abuse of an elderly
relative or abuse of an intimate heterosexual or homosexual partner. See, e.g.,
DAVID ISLAND & PATRICK LETELLIER, MEN WHO BEAT THE MEN WHO LovE
THElI: BATTERED GAY MEN AND DoMEsTIc VIOLENCE (1991) (discussing abuse
between male homosexuals); JOHN E.B. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT (1992) (examining child abuse); KARL A. PILLEMER & ROSALIE S.
WOLF, ELDER ABUSE: CONFLICT IN THE FAMILY (1986) (examining elder abuse);
CLARE M. RENZETTI, VIOLENT BETRAYAL: PARTNER ABUSE IN LESBIAN RELATION-
sHIs (Diane S. Foster, ed., 1992) (positing that violence in lesbian relationships
occurs at approximately the same frequency as violence in heterosexual
relationships).
10. Women are six times more likely than men to be the victim of a violent
crime committed by an intimate partner. A WEEK IN THE LIFE, supra note 1, at
ix. Violence presents the greatest public health risk to adult women-greater
than automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer deaths combined. Novello,
supra note 1, at 3132. Nationally, more than ninety women were murdered
each week in 1991; men murdered nine out of ten of these women. A WEEK IN
THE LIFE, supra note 1, at ix. This Note's deliberate gender focus also comports
with the legislature's intent and policy concerns in enacting the new domestic
homicide statute. See Senator Mike Freeman, Remarks at the Meeting of the
Minnesota Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting (April 12, 1990) (available on
tape at the Minnesota Legislative Library, SF No. 1860) (stating that in 1989,
eighteen women died at the hands of their abusive partners in Minnesota).
11. As of the date of this Note, the State of Minnesota had charged six
defendants with first degree domestic homicide. See State v. Grube, 8th Jud.
Dist., Lac Qui Parle County, Ct. File No. K7-93-214 (indicted Nov. 19, 1993);
State v. Miranda-Alonso, 4th Jud. Dist., Hennepin County, SIP 93-047664 (in-
dicted June 24, 1993); State v. Freeman, 6th Jud. Dist., St. Louis County, Ct.
File No. KF-93-600188 (indicted March 26, 1993; State v. Auchampach, 1st Jud.
Dist., Goodhue County, Ct. File No. K9-93-469 (indicted March 1, 1993); State
v. Davis, 4th Jud. Dist., Hennepin County, SIP 92-088020 (indicted Dec. 22,
1992); State v. Yach, 3d Jud. Dist., Winona County, Ct. File No. K4-92-1325
(indicted Nov. 5, 1992).
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successfully, the statute's constitutionality. 12 Adding further
uncertainty to the question of the statute's constitutionality, in
three states defendants have challenged nearly identical child
abuse homicide statutes, with varying results.13 Two recent
12. Defendant's Memorandum of Law, Dec. 20, 1993, Grube, 8th Jud. Dist.,
Lac Qui Parle County, Ct. File No. K7-93-214 (indicted Nov. 19, 1993); Defend-
ant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Aug. 19, 1993, Miranda-
Alonso, 4th Jud. Dist., Hennepin County, SIP 93-047664 (indicted June 24,
1993); Memorandum of Law, July 16, 1993 at 10-14, Freeman, 6th Jud. Dist.,
St. Louis County, Ct. File No. KF-93-600188 (indicted March 26, 1993); Notice
of Motion and Motion at 7-10, Auchampach, 1st Jud. Dist., Goodhue County, Ct.
File No. K9-93-469 (indicted March 1, 1993); Notice of Motion and Motion to
Dismiss as Unconstitutional, April 23, 1993, Davis, 4th Jud. Dist., Hennepin
County, SIP 92-088020 (indicted Dec. 22, 1992); Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Declare Unconstitutional, August 23, 1993, Davis, 4th Jud. Dist.,
Hennepin County, SIP 92-088020 (indicted Dec. 22, 1992); Defendant's Brief
Challenging Constitutionality, Dec. 2, 1992, Yach, 3d Jud. Dist., Winona
County, Ct. File No. K4-92-1325 (indicted Nov. 5, 1992). The courts denied re-
quests by the defenses for dismissal in each of these cases. Order on Omnibus
Hearing of B.W. Christopherson, Dec. 23, 1993 at 10, Grube, 8th Jud. Dist., Lac
Qui Parle County, Ct. File No. K7-93-214 (indicted Nov. 19, 1993); Trial Tran-
script, Marilyn Brown Rosenbaum, Sept. 24, 1993 at 21, Miranda-Alonso, 4th
Jud. Dist., Hennepin County, SIP 93-047664 (indicted June 24, 1993); Order of
Judge John T. Oswald, August 11, 1993 at 2, Freeman, 6th Jud. Dist., St. Louis
County, Ct. File No. KF-93-600188 (indicted March 26, 1993); Guilty Verdict
Form, Dec. 1, 1993, Auchampach, 1st Jud. Dist., Goodhue County, Ct. File No.
K9-93-469 (indicted March 1, 1993); Order and Memorandum of Judge John J.
Sommerville, July 6, 1993, Davis, 4th Jud. Dist., Hennepin County, SIP 92-
088020 (indicted Dec. 22, 1992); Initial Omnibus Order and Bench Memoran-
dum of Judge Lawrence T. Collins, Feb. 3, 1993, Yach, 3d Jud. Dist., Winona
County, Ct. File No. K4-92-1325 (indicted Nov. 5, 1992). The constitutionality
of the statute remains unsettled, however, because the trial courts based their
decisions on different grounds. Goodhue, Lac Qui Parle, St. Louis, and Henne-
pin County courts held the statute constitutional without issuing an opinion.
Trial Transcript, Marilyn Brown Rosenbaum, Sept. 24, 1993 at 21, Miranda-
Alonso, 4th Jud. Dist., Hennepin County, SIP 93-047664 (indicted June 24,
1993); Order of Judge John T. Oswald, August 11, 1993, Freeman, 26th Jud.
Dist., St. Louis County, Ct. File No. KF-93-600188 (indicted March 26, 1993).
Winona and Hennepin County courts held the constitutionality of the statute
unripe for decision. Order and Memorandum of John J. Sommerville, July 6,
1993, Davis, 4th Jud. Dist., Hennepin County, SIP 92-088020 (indicted Dec. 22,
1992); Initial Omnibus Order and Bench Memorandum of Judge Lawrence T.
Collins, Feb. 3, 1993, Yach, 3d Jud. Dist., Winona County, Ct. File No. K4-92-
1325 (indicted Nov. 5, 1992).
13. In 1993, the Washington Court of Appeals upheld its homicide by abuse
statute, WASH. REv. CODE § 9A32.055 (1988), against a constitutional chal-
lenge. State v. Russell, 848 P.2d 743, 750 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). In 1992, the
Tennessee Supreme Court struck down its statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
202(a)(4) (1991) (amended in 1993), on state constitutional grounds. State v.
Hale, 840 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tenn. 1992). The Tennessee Legislature responded
to the Hale decision by amending its child-abuse murder statute. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(4) (Supp. 1993). That same year, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held that a pre-trial constitutional challenge to Minnesota's child
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convictions under the domestic homicide statute14 provide the
Minnesota appellate courts with an opportunity to rule on the
statute's constitutionality.15
Section I of this Note introduces Minnesota's new domestic
homicide statute, discusses its limited legislative history, and
compares it to three similar first degree child abuse murder
statutes.1 6 Section II discusses the strengths of the new statute,
particularly the direction it takes in criminal jurisprudence.
The statute significantly transforms the legal analysis of kill-
ings between intimates, reflecting important aspects of feminist
legal theory and addressing present gender inequities in homi-
cide law. In light of the pending challenges of the statute, Sec-
tion III argues that the Minnesota appellate courts should
uphold the statute's constitutionality in order to facilitate the
use of the statute. Finally, this Note concludes that Minnesota
has enacted a theoretically sound and legally acceptable statute
and that other states should adopt similar legislation.
I. MINNESOTA'S DOMESTIC HOMICIDE STATUTE
In 1990, in response to the growing number of reported do-
mestic homicides, 17 Minnesota enacted the "domestic homicide
statute."'8 This statute expands the traditional mens rea evalu-
ation in murder cases-that of the defendant's state of mind at
abuse murder statute was unripe for decision. State v. Jennings, 487 N.W.2d
536, 539 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
14. Guilty Verdict Form, Jan. 15, 1994, Grube, 8th Jud. Dist., Lac Qui
Parle County, Ct. File No. K7-93-214 (indicted Nov. 19, 1993); Guilty Verdict
Form, Dec. 1, 1993, Auchampach, 1st Jud. Dist., Goodhue County, Ct. File No.
K9-93-469 (indicted March 1, 1993).
15. The defendants will challenge the statute on constitutional grounds.
Interview with Scott Swanson, Minnesota State Public Defender, in Minneapo-
lis, Minnesota (Feb. 11, 1994).
16. MnqN. STAT. § 609.185(5) (Supp. 1994); WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.32.055
(1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(4) (1991) (amended in 1993).
17. In Minnesota, in 1991, "[a]t least [twelve] women.., were murdered in
cases where the suspected, alleged or convicted perpetrator was a current or
former husband, boyfriend, intimate partner, household or family member, or
acquaintance of the woman." MINNESOTA COALITION FOR BATrERED WOMEN,
WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN MURDERED IN MINNESOTA 1991 (1991). In 1992,
this number increased to 32. MINNEsOTA COALITION FOR BATTERED WOMEN,
WOMEN AND CHIUDREN MURDERED IN MINNESOTA IN 1992 (1992). By mid-1993,
at least nineteen women had already been similarly killed. MiNNESOTA COALI-
TION FOR BATIERED WOMEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN MURDERED IN MINNESOTA
(To DATE: AUGUST 31, 1993) (1993).
18. MINN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (Supp. 1994).
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the time of the killing' 9-to include several characteristics of
the defendant's offense. The statute classifies a killing as first
degree murder if the defendant was closely related to the victim,
repeatedly abused the victim in the past, was abusing the victim
at the time of her death, and killed the victim "under circum-
stances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life."20
Although the domestic homicide statute lacks significant
legislative history, the legislature modeled the statute after sim-
ilar approaches to the problem in the area of child abuse. 21 The
Minnesota legislature copied the language of its domestic homi-
cide statute almost entirely from its 1988 child abuse first de-
gree murder statute.22 In turn, the legislature modeled its child
abuse murder provision after a 1987 Washington homicide by
abuse statute.23 The Tennessee legislature also enacted a simi-
lar child abuse murder statute in 1988.24
These statutes do not conform to conventional murder clas-
sifications.25 Unlike traditional first degree murder, 26 they do
not require the state to prove either premeditation or that the
19. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, CRMINAL LAw, §§ 7.1-7.13
(2d ed. 1986) (discussing traditional murder classifications); see also MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 210.2, cmt. 1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (explaining the requi-
site mental state for criminal homicide).
20. MINN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (Supp. 1994).
21. The Senate Judiciary Committee discussed the statute for about fifteen
minutes on two separate days. Meeting of Minnesota Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee (March 8, 1990) (available on tape at the Minnesota Legislative Library,
SF No. 2192); Meeting of Minnesota Senate Judiciary Committee (March 9,
1990) (available on tape at the Minnesota Legislative Library, SF No. 2192).
22. MINN. STAT. § 609.185(5) (Supp. 1994).
23. Telephone Interview with Jean Wagenius, Minnesota State Represen-
tative (Sept. 15, 1993); see WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.055 (1988). The Washing-
ton legislature enacted its statute in response to a highly publicized child abuse
case in its community in which an abusive father killed his three-year-old son.
State v. Russell, 848 P.2d 743, 748 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v. Creek-
more, 783 P.2d 1068 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989)).
24. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(4) (1991) (amended in 1993). The
Tennessee legislature enacted the statute in response to the brutal killing of a
twenty-one-month-old baby by his mother's boyfriend. State v. Hale, 840
S.W.2d 307, 310 n.3 (Tenn. 1992) (citing State v. Bowers, 1989 WL 86576,
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1989)). The boyfriend had committed a series of brutal and
sadistic assaults against his girlfriend's twenty-one-month-old son, ultimately
killing the child. Bowers, 1989 WL 86576, at *1.
25. Historically, lawmakers have only classified certain types of homicides
as "murder": intent to kill murder, felony murder, "depraved heart" murder,
intent to do serious bodily injury murder, and homicides committed in an un-
reasonable passion. See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 19, § 7.1(a).
26. See generally LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 19, §§ 7.2, 7.5, 7.7 (discuss-
ing intent to kill murder, felony murder, and other traditional first degree mur-
der classifications).
1290
DOMESTIC HOMICIDE STATUTE
defendant specifically intended the victim's death.27 The stat-
utes also differ from the typical felony-murder rule, which pro-
vides for first degree murder when a foreseeable death occurs
during the commission of a felony.28 The abuse murder statutes
do not focus on felonious conduct, but rather on the ongoing abu-
sive relationship that ultimately directly caused the victim's
death.29
The domestic homicide statute contains four main elements,
each of which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.30
First, the state must establish that the defendant previously
abused the homicide victim.3 1 The statute describes this ele-
ment as a "past pattern of domestic abuse."32 Although the stat-
ute defines the term "domestic abuse" in detail,33 it leaves the
27. The domestic homicide statute provides that the killing occur "under
circumstances other than those described in [the premeditation and intent
clause]." MiNN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
28. For a succinct discussion of the felony murder rule, see LAFAvE &
Scorr, supra note 19, § 7.5. In Minnesota, the first degree felony murder stat-
ute also requires that the defendant entertain an intent to kill. MmN. STAT.
§ 609.185(3) (1992).
29. See MN. STAT. § 609.185(5)-(6) (Supp. 1994); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 9A.32.055 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(4) (1991) (amended in
1993).
30. In a criminal prosecution, due process requires the state to prove every
essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
U.S. 79, 84-85 (1986); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970).
31. Mrm. STAT. § 609.185(6) (Supp. 1994).
32. Id. All three child abuse statutes contain a similar prior acts element.
The language of Minnesota's child abuse statute is nearly identical to its domes-
tic homicide statute, requiring a "past pattern of child abuse." Id. § 609.185(5).
The Washington statute provides that the defendant must have "previously en-
gaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture" of the homicide victim.
WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.32.055 (1988). In Tennessee, the statute required the
state to prove that the "death result[ed] from one or more incidents of a pro-
tracted pattern or multiple incidents" of abuse. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
202(a)(4) (1991) (amended in 1993). As amended, Tennessee's statute requires
that the defendant commit aggravated child abuse against the homicide victim.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(4) (Supp. 1993).
33. MINN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (Supp. 1994. The statute originally defined
"domestic abuse" as an act of first, second, or third degree assault. Mn. STAT.
§ 609.185(6) (Supp. 1991). All three types of assault are felony offenses. See
MINN. STAT. §§ 609.221, 609.222, 609.223 (1991 & Supp. 1994) (statutes for
first, second and third degree assault, respectively). In 1992, the legislature
significantly expanded the definition to include the additional acts of fifth de-
gree assault, first through fourth degree criminal sexual conduct and terroristic
threats. See MJNN. STAT. §§ 609.224, 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345,
609.713 (1991 & Supp. 1994) (statutes for fifth degree assault, first through
fourth degree criminal sexual conduct and terroristic threats, respectively).
This amendment extended the criminal sexual conduct provisions to adult vic-
tims, a protection previously given only to minors under the domestic abuse
1994] 1291
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term "pattern" undefined.34 For example, the statute does not
specify how many incidents of prior abuse the state must prove,
or for how long a period the abuse must have occurred, nor does
it explain what type or quantum of evidence the state needs to
prove the pattern of abuse.35
Second, the domestic homicide statute requires proof that
defendant was committing "domestic abuse" against the homi-
cide victim at the time of her death.36 The statute uses the same
definition of "domestic abuse" for this element as it does for the
"past pattern" element. 37 The definition incorporates inten-
tional criminal offenses, including all levels of assault, criminal
sexual conduct, and terroristic threats3 81-although an act of
"domestic abuse" that kills will likely be a high level assault.
This element ensures that the defendant intended to at least
harm the victim at the time of her death.
The third element of the statute requires that the killing
occur under "circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference
to human life."39 Although the meaning of this element invites
some confusion,40 it appears to signify an aggravated form of
definition of the Domestic Abuse Act. See Mm'N. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(ii)
(1992 & Supp. 1994) (definition under Domestic Abuse Act). Moreover, with the
addition of fifth degree assault, the underlying conduct grew to include misde-
meanor offenses. Mm. STAT. § 609.224 (1991 & Supp. 1994). In support of
this amendment, Senator Jane Ranum testified that the changes reflect the
type of conduct prosecutors often see in the abusive relationships. Senator Jane
Ranum, Remarks to the Minnesota Senate Judiciary Committee, March 13,
1992 (available on tape at the Minnesota Legislative Library, SF No. 1687).
34. MiNN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (Supp. 1994).
35. Id.; see infra Part III.B.1 (discussing this aspect of the statute as it
relates to its constitutional specificity).
36. MJNN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (Supp. 1994).
37. Id.; see supra note 33 (explaining the statute's definition of "domestic
abuse").
38. See supra note 33 (describing the criminal offenses that constitute "do-
mestic abuse" under the statute).
39. MINN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (Supp. 1994). Both Minnesota and Washing-
toen's child abuse murder statutes contain the identical element. Compare
MINN. STAT. § 609.185(5) (Supp. 1994) with MimN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (Supp.
1994); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.055 (1988). Tennessee's statute lacked any
mens rea requirement. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(4) (1991) (amended in
1993).
40. In State v. Pitt the court expressed its difficulty in defining this phrase,
stating that "[t]here is no legal definition [the Court] can go to and say this is
how the law defines it. It is really a question of fact ... [tihe term in and of
itself is the ordinary meaning of the words put together." 612 A.2d 60, 63
(Conn. App. Ct. 1992). Some courts interpret this phrase to exclude conduct
intentionally directed at a particular individual-a meaning at odds with the
domestic homicide statute. See, e.g., Haney v. State, 603 So.2d 368, 399 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991); State v. Anderson, 616 P.2d 612, 618 (Wash. 1982) (en banc).
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recklessness. 41 The legislative history indicates that while a de-
fendant need not specifically intend to kill, his conduct toward
the victim must be more than accidental. 42 This requirement
thus guards against a first degree murder conviction in a purely
accidental death.
The fourth element requires that the defendant be closely
related to the victim. Although patterned after the child abuse
murder statute,43 this element substantially departs from its
predecessors. While the child abuse murder legislation is appli-
cable only to young victims or other narrowly defined depen-
dents,44 the domestic homicide statute extends to a relatively
broad class of victims of domestic abuse: any "family or house-
hold member."45 Recognizing that not only children suffer from
domestic violence, this definition includes spouses, former
41. According to the Model Penal Code, this phrase signifies extreme reck-
lessness, greater than a "gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) cmt. 4
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) (citing to § 2.02(2)(c) of the MPC). Some courts
construe this phrase to mean recklessness directed at a specific individual. See,
e.g., State v. Jimenez, 608 A.2d. 996, 1004 (N.J. 1992); Kruse v. Common-
wealth, 704 S.W.2d. 192, 194 (Ky. 1985).
42. Senator Mike Freeman, Remarks at the Minnesota Judiciary Commit-
tee Meeting (April 12, 1990) (SF 2192, available on tape at the Minnesota Legis-
lative Library).
43. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting that the Minnesota
legislature generally patterned its domestic homicide statute after its child
abuse murder statute).
44. Minnesota's child abuse murder statute applies only to minor victims.
MuNN. STAT. § 609.185(5) (Supp. 1994). The Tennessee statute covered the
death of any child under the age of thirteen. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(4)
(1991) (amended in 1993). The Washington statute applies to the death of "a
child, a developmentally disabled person, or a dependent adult," yet it narrowly
defines "dependent adult" to include only elderly individuals and persons with
severe physical or mental disabilities who rely on others to provide "basic neces-
sities." WASH. REV. CODE 9A.32.055(2) (1988).
45. The statute incorporates the definition of "family or household mem-
ber" from the Domestic Abuse Act. See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b)
(Supp. 1994) (definition in Domestic Abuse Act). Although proponents of Min-
nesota's statute seemed most concerned with the violence against women by
their male intimate partners, the expansive definition includes the following
categories:
spouses, former spouses, parents and children, persons related by
blood, and persons who are presently residing together or who have
resided together in the past, and persons who have a child in common
regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at
any time... [including] a man and woman if the woman is pregnant
and the man is alleged to be the father, regardless of whether they
have been married or have lived together at any time.
Id. The definition does not include, however, an intimate partner if the rela-
tionship has not involved having a child or living together.
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spouses, parents and cohabitants, and persons having a child in
common.
46
II. EXPANDING TRADITIONAL NOTION OF MENS REA
The domestic homicide statute's unique elements provide a
new approach to evaluating the defendant's culpability in homi-
cides between intimates, reflective of modern trends in feminist
jurisprudence.47 In particular, two of the elements combine to
create a fundamentally different analysis of the violence-the
defendant-victim relationship and the "past pattern of domestic
46. The Minnesota legislature lifted the language almost entirely from its
child abuse statute, but did not discuss the ramifications of changing the class
of victims covered in the domestic homicide statute. See Minnesota Senate Leg-
islative Session, 89th Day (April 12, 1990) (available on tape at the Minnesota
Legislative Library, SF No. 1860); Meeting of Minnesota Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee (March 8, 1990) (available on tape at the Minnesota Legislative Library,
SF No. 2192); Meeting of Minnesota Senate Judiciary Committee (March 9,
1990) (available on tape at the Minnesota Legislative Library, SF No. 2192).
Across the country, states are noticeably ready to recognize the need for
protection of young children from their abusers. For example, the following
state statutes include the death of minor as an aggravating factor for a capital
sentencing hearing: Arizona (ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(9) (1989 &
Supp. 1993)); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. Chap. 720, para. 5/9-1(b)(7) (Smith-Hurd
1993)); Louisiana (LA. CODE CRIM. PIoc. ANN. art. 905.4(A)(10) (West Supp.
1993)); Mississippi (Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(d) (1988)); and South Caro-
lina (S.C. CODE ANN § 16-3-20(C)(a)(10) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993)). Utah recog-
nizes the intentional killing of a child under the age of 14 years as a capital
offense, if the offender killed while committing child abuse. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-202(1)(d) (1990 & Supp. 1993). In Minnesota, recent statutory changes
facilitate the prosecution of child abuse cases by creating various confidential
privileges and exceptions to certain hearsay rules, in order to grant the state
easier access to incriminating evidence. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subds. 2-4
(1988 & Supp. 1994).
Similar legislation in the area of domestic abuse faces greater opposition.
Some legal scholars will likely argue that including mature, able-bodied women
in the class of victims protected by statutes such as the domestic homicide stat-
ute contributes to the already-existing patriarchal and protectionist treatment
of women, and therefore bolsters the pervasive stereotype of women as "vic-
tims." See Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of
Pornography, 79 VA. L. Rav. 1099, 1147-52 (1993) (positing that anti-pornogra-
phy measures perpetuate "demeaning stereotypes about women" and the "dis-
empowering notion that women are essentially victims").
47. Nothing in its legislative history indicates that feminist groups had any
direct influence on this statute. See Minnesota Senate Legislative Session,
89th Day (April 12, 1990) (available on tape at the Minnesota Legislative Li-
brary, SF No. 1860); Meeting of Minnesota Senate Judiciary Committee (March
8, 1990) (available on tape at the Minnesota Legislative Library, SF No. 2192);
Meeting of Minnesota Senate Judiciary Committee (March 9, 1990) (available
on tape at the Minnesota Legislative Library, SF No. 2192).
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abuse" requirement. 48 These elements direct courts to expand
the evaluation of the defendant's culpability beyond his state of
mind at the time of the killing to include the defendant's ongoing
abusive relationship with the victim. Although not specifically
required by the statute, the courts can further strengthen the
statute's underlying purpose by permitting the state to intro-
duce expert testimony on battered women's syndrome in its
case-in-chief. In addition, the new legislation will help to ad-
dress the present inequity in the treatment of male and female
defendants in spousal murder cases.49 By both expanding the
traditional mens rea analysis in homicides and balancing the in-
equities in spousal murder cases, Minnesota's new statute sig-
nificantly improves the law's treatment of domestic killings.
A. LEARNING FROM FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
Although not a direct product of feminist reform,50 the "fam-
ily or household member" and "past pattern of domestic abuse"
elements, in light of general feminist legal methods,51 provide
valuable insight into the value of the new statute. The domestic
homicide statute reflects feminist jurisprudence by taking the
experiences of women and children in abusive relationships seri-
ously5 2 and by more adequately addressing the underlying harm
of intimate killings.
48. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (Supp. 1994).
49. According to one expert, the average sentence for a woman who kills
her spouse or companion is fifteen to twenty years, compared to an average
sentence of two to six years for a man who kills his spouse. Nancy Gibbs, 'Til
Death Do Us Part, ToE, Jan. 18, 1993, at 38, 42 (quoting Michael Dowd, Direc-
tor, Pace University Battered Women's Justice Center); see infra notes 79-93
and accompanying text (discussing the disparate impact of the traditional mur-
der classifications on male and female defendants).
50. This Note uses the term "feminist" in its broadest sense, and does not
intend to obscure the important differences among feminists and their ap-
proaches. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L.
REV. 829, 833-36 (1990) (arguing that the important differences among feminist
perspectives should not be overlooked). For examples of several different femi-
nist perspectives, see Sharon Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syn-
drome, A Black Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA WoMEN's L.J. 191 (1991); Patricia
A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence, Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY Wo-
EmEN's L. J. 191 (1989-1990); Angela Harris, Race & Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
51. Feminist legal methods "reflect the status of women as 'outsiders,' who
need ways of challenging and undermining dominant legal conventions and of
developing alternative conventions which take better account of women's exper-
iences and needs." Bartlett, supra note 50, at 831.
52. "Feminist method starts with the very radical act of taking women seri-
ously, believing what we say about ourselves and our experience is important
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The statute's expansive class of victims, any "family or
household member,"53 highlights the importance of the relation-
ship between the perpetrator and the victim in evaluating the
homicide's severity. Several feminist critiques of criminal law
advocate looking to the underlying relationship and asking,
based on that relationship, what responsibility the defendant
owes the victim. 54 The statute recognizes that violence between
intimates constitutes a different, graver harm to society than
random, violent killing, and penalizes the killing accordingly. 55
Feminist groups espouse several different characterizations
of the relationship between parties in abusive relationships, at
least two of which help explain why women remain in these rela-
tionships and support the implementation of severe penalties in
intimate killings.5 6 Cultural feminists posit that women, due
largely to the traditional role as mothers and caretakers, are es-
sentially "connected" with others.5 7 This "connection" creates
and valid, even when (or perhaps especially when) it has little or no relation-
ship to what has been or is being said about us." Christine A. Littleton, Femi-
nist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L. REv. 751, 764
(1989) (book review).
53. See supra note 45 (discussing the definition of "family or household
member" in the domestic homicide statute).
54. For example, two feminist academics argue that courts should apply
the common law confidential relationship doctrine to non-stranger rape cases,
thus imposing a heightened duty of care to the victim. Beverly Balos & Mary
Louise Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust: Nonstranger Rape, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 599, 602-11 (1991).
55. In a feminist critique of the United States' capital sentencing scheme,
Elizabeth Rappaport questions why killing a family member is not an aggravat-
ing factor for a capital offense. Elizabeth Rappaport, Some Questions About
Gender and the Death Penalty, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 501 (1990). She
argues that adding this factor would "bring the criminal law into alignment
with emerging awareness of the gravity and magnitude of the problem of family
violence." Id. at 560. She also comments that currently "[o]ur law of homicide
reveals a moral outlook in which greater opprobrium normally attaches to the
killing of strangers than to the killing of intimates"-unless the defendant
killed the family member for pecuniary gain. Id. at 559.
56. Patricia A. Cain identifies four schools of feminist thought: liberal,
radical, cultural, and postmodern. Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits
of Equality, 24 GA. L. Rv. 803, 827-41 (1990). This Note focuses on two of
these schools, radical and cultural feminism, and the different ways in which
these schools characterize the relationship between parties in abusive
relationships.
57. Women have a "different voice," which informs their moral judgement.
Cain, supra note 56, at 836 (discussing CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE
(1982)). An example of cultural feminist methodology, Robin West's "connection
thesis" captures the idea that women place a high value on relationships and
the accompanying responsibility to care for their partner. Robin West, Juris-
prudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 18 (1988).
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for women a strong sense of duty and responsibility,58 which in
turn explains why they often remain in abusive relationships.5 9
Cultural feminists encourage the law to recognize that violence
between members of the same family or household constitutes a
breach of trust,60 deserving of severe punishment. Radical femi-
nists argue that the combination of an abusive relationship and
society's systemic structure of power and dominance force wo-
men to be "connected," or tied, to their partners. 6 1 This combi-
nation creates a physical dependence and vulnerability which
prevent victims from escaping an abusive relationship.6 2 An in-
timate killing represents the ultimate exploitation of this vul-
nerability, likewise deserving of a harsh penalty. The intimate
relationship, cast in either light, provides significant justifica-
tion for aggravating the punishment.
The statute's "past pattern of domestic abuse" element also
reflects feminist jurisprudence,6 3 by forcing an evaluation of a
particular act of violence within its context. The statute ex-
pands the traditional focus on the defendant's state of mind at
the precise time of the killing to include the defendant's history
of violence against the victim. 64 Instead of using traditional
58. West, supra note 57, at 14-21 (discussing and citing CAROL GILLIGAN,
IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982)).
59. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 19-23 (1991) (noting that mother-
hood and women's dedication to family often conflict with the need to leave an
abusive environment).
60. As a central premise of her "connection thesis," West argues that
"[w]omen view the morality of actions against a standard of responsibility to
others, rather than against a standard of rights and autonomy from others."
West, supra note 57, at 18.
61. Cf Cain, supra note 56, at 832-35 (citing Christine Littleton, Recon-
structing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279 (1987) and CATHERINE MACK-
INNON, FEMN ISM UNMODIFIED (1987)) (emphasizing that radical feminism
focuses on male domination of women as a class).
62. See Mahoney, supra note 56, at 5-6 (noting that "at the moment of sepa-
ration or attempted separation.., the batterer's quest for control often becomes
most acutely violent and potentially lethal"). Although many believe that eco-
nomic necessity is the reason women do not leave their batterers, it is apparent
that women often economically support their abusers. Margaret Baldwin, Split
at the Root: Prostitution and Feminist Discourses of Law Reform, 5 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 47, 62 (1992) (citing Ann Jones, Family Matters, in THE SEXUAL LIB-
ERALS AND THE ATrACK ON FEMINsm 61, 63 (Dorchen Leidholdt & Janice Ray-
mond eds., 1990).
63. For a discussion of feminist jurisprudence, see Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the Women's Movement,
61 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 589, 603 (1986). Schneider writes that "[f]or feminists, the-
ory is not 'out there,' but rather is based on the concrete, daily, and 'trivial'
experiences of individuals." Id.
64. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (Supp. 1994).
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mens rea analysis to freeze-frame the violent killing and evalu-
ate its degree of harm based on the isolated event,65 the new law
treats the killing as the culmination of the defendant's abusive
conduct which the homicide victim has endured.
Feminist legal scholars have long encouraged the courts to
look more carefully at the particular circumstances and history
surrounding a violent act to evaluate the harm.66 For example,
feminist reform in the area of self-defense has led to a contex-
tual analysis in cases in which a battered spouse kills her abu-
sive partner.67 Courts have increasingly permitted expert
testimony on the "battered woman's syndrome"68 to assist in the
female defendant's self-defense claim.69 This movement seeks
to include an expansive picture of what a battered woman con-
fronts both in her abusive relationship and in the greater society
that fails to offer her social recognition, support, and material
alternatives.7 0
65. See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 19, §§ 7.2(b), 7.7(a).
66. See Schneider, supra note 63, at 606-08 (discussing State v. Wanrow,
559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (en banc), a case in which the author was actively
involved). The female defendant in State v. Wanrow was a 5'4" Native Ameri-
can woman with a broken leg, who had reason to believe that the decedent had
tried to molest one of her children. 559 P.2d 548, 550-51 (Wash. 1977). The
jury convicted Wanrow of second-degree murder. Id. The Supreme Court of
Washington reversed the conviction in a pivotal decision in the area of self-
defense. A plurality held that the trial court's jury instructions regarding the
defendant's self-defense claim violated Washington law. Id. at 556-59. In es-
sence, the plurality held that the trial court must instruct the jury to consider
the female defendant's self-defense claim from her perspective, placing her ac-
tions within the context of her experience and her knowledge at the time of the
killing. Id.
67. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women:
Sex-Bias in the Law of Self Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 639-44
(1980) (arguing, from her experience in the Wanrow case and her involvement
in the feminist movement of the 1970s, that the law should move toward appli-
cation of a sex-neutral, individualized examination of each defendant's circum-
stances in order to have equal treatment of all defendant's claiming self-
defense); see also Legal Responses, supra note 5, at 1574-85 (discussing the de-
fense of battered women who kill).
68. For a general explanation of this syndrome, see LENORE E. WALKER,
THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984).
69. Across the country, the trend continues toward general acceptance of
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome. See James 0. Pearson, Jr.,
Annotation, Admissibility of Expert or Opinion Testimony on Battered Wife or
Battered Woman Syndrome, 18 A.L.R. 4TH 1153 (1982 & Supp. 1993) (and cases
cited therein); Cynthia L. Coffee, A Trend Emerges: A State Survey on the Ad-
missibility of Expert Testimony Concerning the Battered Woman Syndrome 25 J.
FAM. L. 373, 396 (1986).
70. Baldwin, supra note 62 at 71 (citing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN SYNDROME 114-15 (1979); see LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LovE:
WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SocuETY RESPONDS (1989)). Some wo-
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Minnesota's domestic homicide statute follows the lead of
feminist reform, and its application may lead to additional de-
velopments. Just as the battered woman syndrome defense
places the "desperate killing" into the context of an ongoing abu-
sive relationship, the domestic homicide statute provides a simi-
lar framework for evaluating the violent killing. Courts should
recognize this important contribution to homicide law and fur-
ther strengthen it by allowing the state, if necessary, to intro-
duce expert testimony on the battered woman's syndrome7 ' in
its case-in-chief. Although expert testimony on battered wo-
man's syndrome is widely accepted in the defense of abuse vic-
tims who kill, 7 2 the law is just beginning to permit its use in
prosecution.73 In many domestic homicide cases, due to the loss
men who show evidence of the battered woman syndrome are able to mitigate
their first degree murder charges. Unfortunately, our legal system continues to
blame a defendant who, "without legally enforceable means to escape abuse," is
forced to "choose" between killing or being killed. Michael A. Buda & Teresa L.
Butler, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Backdoor Assault on Domestic Violence,
23 J. FAm. L. 359, 390 (1984-85). Although the battered woman defense is be-
coming increasingly accepted, many urge that it should be strengthened to com-
pletely exonerate the defendant rather than just mitigating the first degree
murder charge. See Alene Kristal, You've Come a Long Way Baby: The Bat-
tered Woman's Syndrome Revisited, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 111 (1991); see
also Richard A. Rosen, On Self Defense, Imminence and Women Who Kill Their
Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REv 371 (1993) (arguing that if defendant can produce
sufficient evidence that killing was necessary, though lacking a showing of im-
minent danger, the jury should be instructed solely on necessity).
71. Pursuant to Rule 702 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, courts may
permit expert testimony if it will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue." MINN. R. EvID. 702 (1993).
72. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. In Minnesota, the Supreme
Court has held expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome admissible
for the defense. State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989). The court
recognized the syndrome as scientifically accepted and commented that the syn-
drome goes "beyond the understanding of the average juror." Id. at 798. The
court placed limitations on the use of the testimony, however, to prevent the
expert from testifying to the ultimate issue of whether the particular defendant
actually suffers from battered woman syndrome. Id.
73. As of this date, the appellate courts in Minnesota have not ruled on the
admissibility of expert testimony in the state's case-in-chief. Other jurisdic-
tions, however, have addressed this specific issue and have admitted the testi-
mony. See Arcoren v. U.S., 929 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir. 1991) (using battered
woman syndrome to assist jury in explaining victim's recanting of grand jury
testimony); State v. Borrelli, 629 A.2d 1105, 1114 (Conn. 1993) (admitting testi-
mony of battered women's syndrome to explain victim's recanting statements);
State v. Baker, 424 A.2d 171, 173 (N.H. 1980) (admitting battered woman syn-
drome to rebut insanity defense); State v. Frost, 577 A.2d 1282, 1288 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (introducing battered woman syndrome to explain
victim's behavior and bolster her credibility); State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165,
1173 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (using battered woman syndrome to rebut defense
1300 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1285
of the primary source of evidence, the introduction of expert tes-
timony on battered women would help the state to re-construct
the "past pattern" and to rebut defenses such as insanity, intoxi-
cation, or self-defense.7 4 The admission of this evidence would
also help the trier of fact to place the killing into its context.
B. BALANCING INEQUITIES IN THE TREATMENT OF INTImATE
VIOLENCE
The domestic homicide statute advances the law governing
intimate violence by changing the point of discussion surround-
ing intimate violence and by addressing present inequities in
spousal murder cases.75 The new statute re-directs the focus of
the legal and popular discussion surrounding domestic violence
from battered women who kill to those who are killed. In con-
trast to society's indifferent treatment of cases in which men kill
their wives, law and popular culture create a spectacle out of the
spousal murder cases in which a "battered woman" kills her hus-
band.7 6 The media's treatment of cases in which an abused wife
kills her husband creates a false impression that such cases fre-
quently occur.77 In reality, out of the 1.6 to 4 million women
who suffer from domestic abuse each year, the state will charge
only 800 to 1,000 women with the death of their abusive part-
claim that victim's behavior is inconsistent with rape claim); see also Joan M.
Schroeder, Using Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence in the Prosecution of a
Batterer, 76 IOWA L. REV. 553 (1991) (discussing several reasons why courts
have admitted expert testimony in the prosecution of a batterer). In Minnesota,
a Hennepin County trial court recently admitted expert testimony on the bat-
tered woman syndrome to assist the state in explaining a rape victim's recanta-
tion and refusal to testify against the defendant at trial. Telephone Interview
with Anne M. Taylor, Hennepin County Attorney, in Minneapolis, Minnesota
(April 4, 1994) (State v. Thompson, 4th Jud. Dist., Hennepin County, SIP No.
93013570).
74. The testimony on battered woman syndrome will illuminate the rela-
tionship between the defendant and his partner and provide an alternative ex-
planation for the defendant's conduct. See, e.g., Baker, 424 A.2d at 173
(admitting a "past pattern" of domestic violence to prove attempted murder was
not caused by mental illness); Frost, 577 A.2d at 1288 (explaining victim's be-
havior); Ciskie, 751 P.2d at 1173 (rebutting defense).
75. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
76. For example, after Francine Hughes' killed her abusive husband by
burning the bed on which he had passed out, her story became overwhelmingly
public through both a novel by Faith McNulty. See FArm McNuLTY, THM BURN-
ING BED (1980) (which also became a made-for-television movie, "The Burning
Bed.")
77. Martha Mahoney points out the irony of the enormous attention that
society gives domestic violence at the point it finally harms men. Mahoney,
supra note 59, at 35.
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ner.7 8 Use of Mnnesota's new statute gives voice to the silenced
violence-the violence that ultimately kills its victims.
Close examination of the domestic homicide statute reveals
that it also helps to balance gender inequities in homicide law,
by altering the traditional framework for determining culpabil-
ity in spousal murder cases.79 Traditional homicide law focuses
primarily on the defendant's state of mind at the specific time of
the killing and classifies the killing based on whether the de-
fendant acted with an intent to kill, a knowledge or awareness of
the probable result of his actions, recklessness, or negligence.80
The law treats the homicidal incident as an isolated act of vio-
lence, determining under what "state of mind" the killing oc-
curred, and only reluctantly examines the violence within the
context of past events.8' This framework effectively disadvan-
tages female defendants by failing to take account of the general
differences between male and female violence.8 2
A comparison of the treatment of male and female defend-
ants intimate homicides illustrates this inequity. On the one
hand, when a woman kills her partner, she will likely face first
degree murder charges due to the characteristically non-con-
frontational setting in these killings.83 These women seek to
78. See Erich D. Andersen & Anne Read-Andersen, Constitutional Dimen-
sions of the Battered Woman Syndrome, 53 Omo ST. L. J. 363, 366 n. 16 (1992)
(citations omitted).
79. See supra note 49.
80. LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 19, § 3.4(c).
81. Laura E. Reece, Women's Defenses to Criminal Homicide and the Right
to Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Need for Relocation of Difference, 1
UCLA WoMmE's L.J. 53, 57-58 (1991) (noting that battered woman syndrome,
postpartum disorders, and rape trauma syndrome reflect the reality of a wo-
man's life, but do not fit into traditional substantive criminal law).
82. Considering the different circumstances under which male and female
homicides occur, commentators often contend that men and women live in two
different cultures of violence. See, e.g., Laurie J. Taylor, Provoked Reason in
Men and Women: Heat of Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self Defense, 33
UCLA L. REv. 1679, 1725 (1986) (concluding that "[a]n understanding of sex
differences in criminal behavior... clearly shows that a law based on the be-
havior of men will make it difficult to judge women fairly").
83. Some studies, however, suggest that it is the exception, and not the
rule, that women kill their abusive partners in a non-confrontational setting.
See, e.g., Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Mis-
conceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 384 (1991)
(citing estimates that between 70% and 90% of all battered women who kill do
so when faced with either an ongoing attack or the imminent threat of death or
serious bodily harm). Nonetheless, if physically weaker than her abusive part-
ner, a woman may resort to surprise tactics and the use of weapons to "fight
back" before a confrontation occurs. Under current law, this type of calculative
conduct lends more easily to a first degree murder charge than to traditional
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mitigate the charges with a self-defense instruction, arguing
that their actions were in response to a history of abuse inflicted
upon them.8 4 The defendants in these cases, however, face the
difficulty of proving to the court that self-defense applies to their
situation.85 Despite vast improvements in the defense of a fe-
male defendant,8 6 the criminal justice system continues to pre-
sumptively treat her as a first degree murderer rather than
looking first to her relationship and experiences with the
deceased.8 7
On the other hand, when an abusive man kills his wife
while beating her, traditional standards render first degree
murder prosecution very difficult.88 For example, if the homi-
cide occurs in the context of a violent and explosive rage, the
state must charge the defendant with second degree murder for
lack of premeditation.8 9 Under current law, the defendant typi-
cally has a strong argument for the mitigation of his offense to
self defense. See Taylor, supra note 82, at 1704-1711 (noting that battered wo-
men who kill find it difficult to prove self-defense).
84. See Legal Responses, supra note 5, at 1574-1597.
85. See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 616 So.2d 1098 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (re-
manding a case in which the trial court convicted the female defendant of first
degree murder in the shooting death of her boyfriend); State v. Norman, 378
S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (holding it proper for the trial court not to instruct the jury
on self-defense in the shooting death of the defendant's husband, despite the
decedents history of extreme physical and mental abuse of the defendant, in-
cluding burning her with cigarettes and forcing her to eat pet food out of pet
bowls and to bark like a dog); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App.
1992) (overturning a trial court's first degree murder conviction of a woman
who produced evidence of approximately twenty-three prior acts of abuse
against her and described the violent encounter in which she ultimately killed
her husband).
86. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing recent re-
forms, such as the battered woman's syndrome).
87. Buda & Butler, supra note 70, at 368 (noting that "[mluch literature
points out the irony of a legal system which chooses a posture of non-interven-
tion and subsequently prosecutes women for murder that they would not have
committed but for the absence of legally acceptable alternatives").
88. The circumstances of the killing present the state with the challenge of
demonstrating premeditation and intent to kill as required by MIN. STAT.
§ 609.185(1) (1991 & Suppp. 1994). See, e.g., State v. Falvey, 1993 WL 276883
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming the defendant's acquittal of both first and sec-
ond degree attempted murder for shooting his estranged wife and his conviction
of attempted heat-of-passion manslaughter, despite his history of abusive be-
havior toward her and the fact that he had driven over to see her with a gun in
his car).
89. MINN. STAT. § 609.19(1) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
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first degree manslaughter 90 if he can persuade the trier of fact
that the victim somehow "provoked" him into the violent rage.91
The traditional framework for evaluating homicide,
although seemingly gender-neutral, provides a mitigation de-
fense that benefits the violent rages more characteristic of
men.9 2 The legal standards that define "adequate provocation"
reflect a male-centered view of "understandable" violence.93 For
example, the most "reasonable" provocation defense occurs when
a man catches his wife in the act of adultery, or even merely
suspects she is committing adultery.9 4
The Minnesota statute effectively limits the possibility of a
repeat-abuser successfully arguing mitigating defenses, such as
"heat of passion," because once the state establishes the defend-
ant's history of abuse against the homicide victim, a provocation
defense loses its relevance-an uncontrollable rage no longer ex-
cuses the violence.95 The statute correctly recognizes that the
killing does not constitute an isolated, uncontrollable rage, but
rather the culmination of harmful, violent conduct that merits a
first degree murder classification.
III. BEYOND TRADITION, YET WITHIN THE
CONSTITUTION
Minnesota's domestic homicide statute, a new approach to
evaluating the defendant's culpability in a homicide, finds
90. In Minnesota, whoever "intentionally causes the death of another per-
son in the heat of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would
provoke a person of ordinary self-control under like circumstances" is guilty of
manslaughter in the first degree. Id. § 609.20(1).
91. A California case provides a disturbing example of such an argument.
See People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976). The defendant in Berry strangled
his wife to death with a telephone cord. Id. at 779. His defense was that he was
provoked into killing her because of a sudden and uncontrollable rage, which
reduced the offense to voluntary manslaughter. Evidence at trial lead the court
to conclude, "Defendants testimony chronicles a two week period of provocatory
conduct by his wife Rachel that could arouse a passion of jealousy, pain and
sexual rage in an ordinary man of average disposition such as to cause him to
act rashly from this passion." Id. at 780-81.
92. Reece, supra note 81, at 56-57.
93. See Taylor, supra note 82, at 1725.
94. LAFAvE & ScOTr, supra note 19, § 7.10(b). As Taylor writes in response
to this phenomenon, "[t]he law of provocation endorses men's ownership of wo-
men's sexuality by expressly sanctioning violent reaction by husbands to their
wives' infidelity." Taylor, supra note 82, at 1696.
95. Even if the state cannot prove a "past pattern" of domestic abuse, if the
defendant violated an order for protection in the killing, the state can charge
him under a new second degree murder statute. See MwN. STAT. § 609.19(3)
(Supp. 1994).
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strong support from feminist jurisprudence and takes an impor-
tant step in combatting domestic violence. The non-traditional
statute has provoked controversy, however, surrounding pri-
marily two constitutional due process issues: whether the stat-
ute is unconstitutionally vague and whether its application
violates the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair
trial. Minnesota defendants argue that the new statute, and
specifically the term "pattern," is unconstitutionally vague.9 6 In
addition, defendants argue that application of the statute will
deprive them of their due process right to a fair trial because its
"past pattern of domestic abuse" element presumptively permits
the introduction of prejudicial prior acts evidence without re-
gard to appropriate evidentiary standards. 97 The statute over-
comes both of these challenges.
On a practical level, a Minnesota defendant challenging the
statute's constitutionality faces formidable obstacles, primarily
because the legislature has the power and broad discretion to
define criminal behavior.98 In deference to the legislature,
courts presume a statute's constitutionality.99 Moreover, the
96. Defendant's Memorandum of Law, Dec. 20, 1993, at 2-5, State v.
Grube, 8th Jud. Dist., Lac Qui Parle County, Ct. File No. K7-93-214 (indicted
Nov. 19, 1993); Order on Omnibus Hearing by Judge B.W. Christopherson at
10, State v. Grube, 8th Jud. Dist., Lac Qui Parle County, Ct. File No. K7-93-214
(indicted Nov. 19, 1993); Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss, Aug. 19, 1993 at 17-19, 33-40, State v. Miranda-Alonso, 4th Jud. Dist.,
Hennepin County, SIP 93-047664 (indicted June 24, 1993); Memorandum of
Law, July 16, 1993 at 10-14, State v. Freeman, 6th Jud. Dist., St. Louis County,
Ct. File No. KF-93-600188 (indicted March 26, 1993); Notice of Motion and Mo-
tion at 7-10, State v. Auchampach, 1st Jud. Dist., Goodhue County, Ct. File No.
K9-93-469 (indicted March 1, 1993); Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss as
Unconstitutional and for Lack of Probable Cause, May 18, 1993 at 5-9, State v.
Davis, 4th Jud. Dist., Hennepin County, SIP 92-088020 (indicted Dec. 22,
1992); Defendant's Brief Challenging Constitutionality, Dec. 2, 1992, State v.
Yach, 3d Jud. Dist., Winona County, Ct. File No. K4-92-1325 (indicted Nov. 5,
1992). The arguments are similar to those made in connection with the child
abuse murder statutes. See, e.g. State v. Jennings, 487 N.W.2d 536, 536 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992); State v. Russell, 848 P.2d 743, 748 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
97. Memorandum of Law, July 16, 1993 at 13-14, Freeman, 6th Jud. Dist.,
St. Louis County, Ct. File No. KG-93-600188 (indicted March 26, 1993); Notice
of Motion and Motion to Dismiss as Unconstitutional and for Lack of Probable
Cause, May 18, 1993 at 4-5, Davis, 4th Jud. Dist., Hennepin County, SIP 92-
088020 (indicted Dec. 22, 1992); see State v. Hale, 840 S.W.2d at 313 (holding
that the provisions of the statute that require the state to establish prior in-
stances of misdemeanor child abuse to prove the elements of first-degree mur-
der are fundamentally unfair).
98. State v. Witt, 245 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Minn. 1976).
99. Minnesota has codified this interpretive canon. See MwN. STAT.
§ 645.17(3) (1986); see also State v. Kimmons, 502 N.W.2d 391, 393 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding the dangerous offender enhancement statute not unconsti-
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challenger bears the heavy burden of demonstrating the stat-
ute's constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.100 In
light of these obstacles and in accordance with established con-
stitutional principles, Minnesota courts should quickly declare
the statute constitutional and other states should follow Minne-
sota's lead and enact similar statutes.
A. VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS
1. The Vagueness Challenge
Under principles of due process, the Supreme Court has
stated that a criminal statute is void-for-vagueness when "[per-
sons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean-
ing and differ as to its application." 01 The doctrine basically
safeguards two important principles: statutes must give ordi-
nary people notice as to what conduct the law prohibits, and
they must also provide adequate standards of application to dis-
courage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' 0 2 The void-
for-vagueness doctrine does not, however, require that a layper-
son understand all statutory terms.' 03 Seemingly vague terms
may offer sufficient clarity if they have a well-settled meaning in
the common law'0 4 or if they are used in other legislation.' 0 5
tutionally vague as applied to the defendant); State v. Willenbring, 454 N.W.2d
268, 270 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding the constitutionality of the third de-
gree criminal sexual conduct statute); State v. Dutton, 450 N.W.2d 189, 194
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (determining statutes proscribing psychotherapist-pa-
tient criminal sexual conduct constitutional).
100. See, e.g., State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn.), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 931 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of Minnesota's murder-of-
an-unborn-child statute); Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 279
(Minn. 1981) (challenging the constitutionality of Minnesota liquor laws); Con-
tos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732, 736 (Minn. 1979) (discussing the constitutional-
ity of the Mineral Registration Act); Kimmons, 502 N.W.2d at 393; Willenbring,
454 N.W.2d at 270.
101. See Connally v. General Construction Co, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see
also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (applying the standard set
forth in Connally); Village of Hoffmnan Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982) (same); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
617 (1954) (same).
102. See, e.g., Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357; Village of Hoffman Estate, 455 U.S.
at 498; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-573 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rock-
ford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Connally, 269 U.S. at 391; State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d
51, 55-56 (Minn. 1992); Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 323; State v. Becker, 351 N.W.2d
923, 925 (Minn. 1984).
103. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 19, § 2.3(b).
104. See, e.g., Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
105. See, e.g., Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 110 (1918).
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The Supreme Court does not require "mathematical certainty"
in statutory language due largely to the inherent limitations of
languagel0 6 and to the necessity of effectuating the purpose of
the legislation.'07
The most flagrant vagueness violations occur when statutes
fail to draw a reasonably clear line between lawful and unlawful
conduct.108 Concerned that a defendant may commit a crime
without an awareness of the act's criminality, the Supreme
Court has held that the constitutionality of a vague statutory
standard closely relates to whether that standard incorporates a
requirement of mens rea.109 Crimes, such as loitering or va-
grancy, which create criminal liability for seemingly innocuous
conduct, most often violate this principle."10 Such statutes are
also more susceptible to discriminatory enforcement because
they place "unfettered discretion" in the hands of police
officers."'
Defendants' void-for-vagueness challenge to the domestic
homicide statute's constitutionality focuses primarily on the
106. See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110 ("condemned to the use of words, we
can never expect mathematical certainty from our language"); Colten v. Ken-
tucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) ("[the vagueness doctrine] is not a principle
designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in
drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of
human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning").
107. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498 ("[t]he degree of
vagueness that the Constitution tolerates-as well as the relative importance of
fair notice and fair enforcement-depends in part on the nature of the enact-
ment"); U.S. v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947) (stating "[tihe Constitution does not
require impossible standards"); see also LAFAvE & ScoTT supra note 19,
§ 2.3(a).
108. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574-578 (1974); Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
109. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979); see Boyce Motor Lines
Inc., v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1952) (expressing concern that a
defendant may be unaware of an act's criminality); Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91, 101-102 (1945) (same).
110. See, e.g. Kolender, 461 U.S. 352 (holding a California statute that re-
quired "credible and reliable" identification from anyone the police approached
unconstitutionally vague); Lanzetta, 306 U.S. 451 (striking down a vagrancy
statute as unconstitutionally vague); People v. Berck, 300 N.E.2d 411 (N.Y.),
cert. denied sub nom, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973) (holding a New York loitering stat-
ute void for vagueness because it failed to distinguish between harmful and
innocent conduct).
111. See Smith, 415 U.S. at 575. The court opined that statutory language
that fails to provide minimal guidelines permits "a standardless sweep [that]
allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilec-
tions." Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 169-70.
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term "pattern," which the statute does not specifically define.' 1 2
To support this point, defendants compare the statute to two
other Minnesota statutes that use the same term: Minnesota's
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)"13 and Minnesota's stalking statute."14 Unlike the do-
mestic homicide statute, these statutes specify the requisite
number of incidents that must occur within a limited time pe-
riod in order to establish a "pattern.""15
This distinction does not affect the domestic homicide stat-
ute's constitutionality and should not, therefore, persuade Min-
nesota courts to strike down the statute. In a Federal RICO
case, the Supreme Court clearly defined the phrase "pattern of
criminal conduct" in a manner consistent with the domestic
homicide statute's use of the term "pattern."": 6 The statute's
specificity also finds support from the Washington case, State v.
Russell, upholding a nearly identical homicide statute"17 against
112. Defendant's Memorandum of Law, Dec. 20, 1993, at 2-5, State v.
Grube, 8th Jud. Dist., Lac Qui Parle County, Ct. File No. K7-93-214 (indicted
Nov. 19, 1993); Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss,
Aug. 19, 1993, State v. Miranda-Alondso, 4th Jud. Dist. Hennysin County SIP
93-047664 (indicted June 24, 1993); Memorandum of Law, July 16, 1993, at 10-
14, State v. Freeman, 6th Jud. Dist., St. Louis County, Ct. File No. KF-93-
600188 (indicted March 26, 1993); Notice of Motion and Motion at Part III,
State v. Auchampach, 1st Jud. Dist., Goodhue County, Ct. File No., K9-93-469
(indicted March 1, 1993); Defendant's Memo, State v. Davis, 4th Jud. Dist.,
Hennepin County, SIP 92-088020 (indicated Dec. 22, 1992); Defendant's Brief
Challenging Constitutionality, Dec. 2, 1992, State v. Yach, 3d Jud. Dist.,
Winona County, Ct. File No. K4-92-1325 (indicted Nov. 5, 1992).
113. Mmm. STAT. § 609.902 (Supp. 1994). The statute defines "pattern of
criminal activity" as "conduct constituting three or more criminal acts that were
committed within ten years of the commencement of the criminal proceeding."
Id. The federal RICO statute similarly requires "at least two acts of racketeer-
ing activity within a ten year period" to establish a "pattern." 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1988).
114. Minnesota's stalking statute defines "pattern of harassing conduct" as
two or more criminal acts within a five-year period against the same victim or
one or more members of a single household. Mn-N. STAT. § 609.749, subd. 5(b)
(Supp. 1994).
115. MnqN. STAT. §§ 609.902, 609.749, subd. 5(b) (Supp. 1994).
116. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989).
For the text of the Court's definition, see infra text accompanying note 128. The
Court, in another Federal RICO case, also specifically addressed the language
"constitutes a violation of" and held that such language does not require crimi-
nal convictions. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985) (citing
U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1980)); see infra notes 148-150 and accom-
panying text (discussing this definition as consistent with the underlying pur-
pose of the domestic homicide statute).
117. WAsH. Rnv. CODE § 9A.32.055(1) (1988). Minnesota modeled both its
domestic and child abuse murder statutes after the Washington statute. See
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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a void-for-vagueness challenge in the conviction of a defendant's
fatal abuse of a young child.118 Although the Tennessee
Supreme Court struck down its child abuse murder statute, it
did not do so on vagueness grounds. 119 Moreoever, it specifically
noted the absence of a requisite mental state like "circumstances
manifesting an extreme indifference to human life" in its stat-
ute,1 20 an element the Minnesota statute includes. Finally, pol-
icy concerns surrounding domestic violence provide further
support for the domestic homicide statute's language. Minne-
sota courts should uphold the statute as written.
2. The Statute's Constitutional Specificity
Minnesota's domestic homicide statute defines its terms suf-
ficiently while permitting enough flexibility in its application to
remain consistent with its underlying purpose. 121 The statute
does not leave persons of common intelligence guessing at its
meaning or its application. 22 The statute provides constitution-
ally specific notice of the conduct it prohibits. 23 Although the
statute does not specifically define "pattern," the term is readily
understood.12 4 As its dictionary definition indicates, "pattern"
signifies a special arrangement or relationship of component
parts.' 25 The Supreme Court defined "pattern," as used in the
Federal RICO statute, stating "[a] 'pattern' is an 'arrangement
118. 848 P.2d 743 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). In State v. Russell, the defendant
challenged the constitutionality of the statute's phrase "pattern or practice of
assault or torture" on vagueness grounds. Id. at 748. The court examined the
phrase in the context of the entire statute and as it applied to the defendant's
conduct. Id. at 749.
119. State v. Hale, 840 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. 1992); see infra notes 161-166 and
accompanying text (discussing the Hale decision in the context of a fairness
challenge to Minnesota's statute).
120. Id. at 315; see infra text accompanying note 137 (discussing this
distinction).
121. See U.S. v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947). For a feminist perspective of
the statute's purpose, see supra Part H.A.
122. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also
Kolender v. Larson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (applying the standard set forth in
Connally); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 498 (1982) (same); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)
(same); supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
123. One purpose of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is to ensure sufficient
notice to defendants. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
124. The Supreme Court has stated that we must "start with the assump-
tion that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used." Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).
125. See WEBsTER's NITH COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 864 (1988) (defining
"pattern" as "a discernible coherent system based on the intended interrelation-
ship of component parts").
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or order of things or activity,'... [iut is not the number of predi-
cates but the relationship that they bear to each other or to some
external organizing principle that renders them 'ordered' or 'ar-
ranged.'" 126 Similarly, the Court defined a pattern of criminal
conduct as "acts that have the same or similar purposes, results,
participants, victims, or methods of commission."
27
The statute's definition of "domestic abuse" clearly describes
this necessary relationship or arrangement of a defendant's
prior conduct by limiting it to listed criminal conduct 28 directed
only at the homicide victim, a "family or household member."129
The statute defines both the prior conduct and the defendant-
victim relationship by directly incorporating well-accepted defi-
nitions from other statutes.' 30
Unlike loitering or vagrancy statutes, Minnesota's statute
also does not make seemingly innocent conduct criminal;' 3 '
rather it proscribes already unlawful conduct. 132 While an indi-
gent may legitimately claim innocence in sitting on the side-
walk, no such claim exists in cases of domestic abuse. Moreover,
the statute incorporates a mens rea requirement for each ele-
ment of the offense: 133 both the underlying abuse and the abuse
at the time of the killing must be intentional, 34 and the killing
must occur under "circumstances manifesting an extreme indif-
ference to human life."1' 5 In striking down its child abuse mur-
126. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989)
(citing 11 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 357 (2d ed. 1989)) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of the statute's phrase, "pattern of racketeering activity").
127. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n. 14 (1985).
128. See supra note 33 (setting forth the criminal violations constituting
"domestic abuse").
129. See supra note 45 (describing definition of "family or household mem-
ber" in MINN. STAT. 518B.01, subd.2(b) (1992 & Supp. 1994)).
130. Prior conduct is defined by several criminal statutes, including as-
saults, criminal sexual conduct, and terroristic threats. See supra note 34.
131. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text (distinguishing the
court's treatment of statutes that make otherwise innocent conduct, such as
loitering, criminal).
132. For the criminal offenses listed under the definition of "domestic
abuse," see supra note 33.
133. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (noting that the constitu-
tionality of a vague standard closely relates to whether the standard incorpo-
rates a mens rea requirement).
134. See supra note 33 (listing the various criminal offenses that constitute
"domestic abuse" under the statute, all of which are intentional crimes).
135. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Although the statute does
not define "circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life"
within its provisions, the phrase is a term of art in criminal statutes. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(a)(2) (1975) (murder); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1104(A)(3) (1989) (second degree murder); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-55 (1985)
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der statute, 136 the Tennessee Supreme Court specifically noted
the absence of a requisite mental state like "circumstances man-
ifesting an extreme indifference to human life."13 7 In contrast,
the Russell court upheld the constitutionality of Washington's
statute, which includes this element. 138
The statute's language also provides adequate standards of
application to discourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment.139 In Russell, the court noted that a statute need only
provide minimal standards for enforcement' 40 and the Supreme
Court has stated that statutes need not be written with "mathe-
matical certainty" to meet constitutional specificity.141 Unlike
loitering or vagrancy statutes, the domestic homicide statute
does not place "unfettered discretion" in the hands of law en-
forcement officials. 142 The defendant must have intentionally
engaged in conduct already considered unlawful-assaulting his
wife as opposed to simply walking down the street. Moreover,
the statute will not lead to discriminatory arrests because of-
ficers detain a homicide suspect regardless of possible charges.
The statute itself also sets precise standards for application
in the court room. It uses terms readily understood in the legal
profession, 143 including "pattern."1' Indeed, Minnesota courts
(manslaughter in the first degree); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(1)(b) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1992) (murder); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2C:11-4 (1982) (manslaughter);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030(1)(b) (1988) (murder in the first degree); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
136. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(4) (1991) (amended in 1993).
137. State v. Hale, 840 S.W.2d 307, 315 (Tenn. 1992).
138. State v. Russell, 848 P.2d 743, 749 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Spo-
kane v. Douglass, 795 P.2d 693 (1990)).
139. See cases cited supra note 102 and accompanying text (stating this
void-for-vagueness principle).
140. 848 P.2d at 749-50 (citing Douglas, 795 P.2d 693).
141. See cases cited supra note 106.
142. See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text (describing the consti-
tutional problems often associated with loitering and vagrancy statutes, and
contrasting the domestic homicide statute).
143. The offenses listed in the statute such as assault, terroristic threats,
and criminal sexual conduct are frequently implemented in the courtroom. See
supra note 33 (listing these offenses). Similarly, the courts should not find it
difficult to apply the term of art, "circumstances manifesting extreme indiffer-
ence to human life." For a list of statutes that use this language, see supra note
135.
144. The Minnesota Supreme court recently upheld the use of the term "pat-
tern" in its patterned sex offender statute, MINN. STAT. § 609.1352 (Supp. 1994),
against a vagueness challenge. State v. Christie, 506 N.W.2d 293, 300-01
(1993).
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frequently use the term "pattern" in their decisions. 145 As long
as judges do not add any requirements to the statute's use of
"pattern," application of the statute will be consistent. In ac-
cordance with common usage and precedent, the court should
require the state to provide evidence of at least two incidents 146
that fit the definition of "domestic abuse," and the fact-finder
should then decide whether the state has proven a pattern of
abuse beyond a reasonable doubt.147
The flexible statutory language is not only constitutional,
but also necessary.' 48 Indeed, a more specific definition of "pat-
tern" may have destroyed the statute's underlying purpose.
Since domestic abuse often occurs behind closed doors and with-
out official documentation, 149 requiring a specific number of in-
cidents to prove a pattern would often prevent prosecution. The
statute, by incorporating lessons of feminist jurisprudence,
works to expose the undocumented, yet real violence.' 50 A spe-
cific number of incidents would also focus too heavily on each
isolated act of violence rather than attacking the abusive pat-
tern of conduct. The power and control typical in violent rela-
tionships does not manifest itself in nicely packaged incidents,
but rather becomes a part of all interactions between the par-
ties. A specific number of prior incidents requirement may con-
tribute to perpetuating a controversial stereotype of the
"worthy" battered woman by effectively saying that only in cases
in which the victim endured the required number of abusive in-
cidents will the legal system recognize the violent conduct as de-
serving of heightened punishment.
Similarly, the statute should not require prior convictions or
even prior charges to establish a "past pattern" of abuse. The
145. See, e.g., State v. Rainer, 411 N.W.2d 490, 497 (Minn. 1987) (using "re-
peating pattern of very similar conduct" to disprove accident); State v. Crocker,
409 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1987) (admitting prior conduct as part of a "'pat-
tern' of similar misconduct"); State v. DeBaere, 356 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Minn.
1984) (admitting evidence of other crimes to show a "pattern" of similar aggres-
sive sexual behavior).
146. See infra text accompanying notes 151-156 (providing justifications for
not adding a specific number of incidents).
147. In a criminal prosecution, due process requires the state to prove every
essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79 (1986); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
148. See supra note 107 (stating that the statute's purpose is a valid consid-
eration in constitutional analysis).
149. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CONRONTING DoEmsric VIOLENCE: A
GUIDE FOR CRmINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 55 (1986) (predicting that there will be
better evidence available as reporting practices continue to improve).
150. See supra Part II.
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language in the definition of domestic abuse, "constitutes a vio-
lation of," does not require a specific degree of proof for each
predicate act of violence, the legislative history clearly notes the
absence of a charge or conviction requirement. 151 Additionally,
the Supreme Court, addressing a similar challenge to nearly
identical statutory language in the federal RICO statute, 5 2
stated the term "violation" does not require a criminal convic-
tion;153 "lilt refers only to a failure to adhere to legal require-
ments."154 Furthermore, requiring convictions or charges would
jeopardize the effectiveness of the statute's underlying purpose
because such documented evidence of domestic violence does not
often exist.' 55 The better interpretation of "violation," therefore
requires the state to prove only failure to adhere to the legal
requirements in the listed offenses.1 56
Thus, the statute as written is constitutionally specific. It
provides adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits as well as
providing adequate standards for its application. In addition,
the statute's flexible language finds support in its underlying
purpose of providing of framework in which to expose the ongo-
ing abusive relationship between the defendant and the victim.
The Minnesota courts should uphold the statute's constitution-
ality against a vagueness challenge.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAiR TRIAL
1. Potential Fairness Challenges
In its due process jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has de-
termined that individuals have a right to a fair adjudicatory pro-
cess when their lives, liberty, or property are at stake.' 57 At a
minimum, due process requires that the law provide defendants
with notice of the charges against them and an opportunity to be
151. Remarks of Representative Wagenius, Minnesota House Judiciary
Committee Meeting, March 4, 1988 (available on tape at the Minnesota Legisla-
tive Library, HF No. 2104) (discussing statutory language in context of the child
abuse murder statute).
152. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
153. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1985) (citing U.S.
v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1980)) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1864(c) (1988).
154. Id. at 489. The court further held that absent specific mention of a
conviction requirement in the statute or its legislative history, the courts
should not read in such a requirement. Id. at 490.
155. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 149.
156. See supra Part II.
157. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940) (stating that a
"charge [must be] fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of preju-
dice, passion, excitement, and tyrannical power").
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heard. 158 In addition, it provides that the criminal trial must
include the basic safeguards of the Bill of Rights. 59 Defendants
may argue that the statute's "past pattern" of abuse element de-
prives them of basic due process protection because it does not
require the state to provide notice of what prior acts evidence it
will introduce at trial and an opportunity to challenge its suffi-
ciency.160 The Tennessee case, State v. Hale,'6 ' striking down
its child abuse murder statute, noted that the defendant "may
be seriously disadvantaged by not receiving sufficient notice of
those instances of prior alleged abuse." 62 Lack of explicit men-
tion of a notice requirement within the statute need not render
it unconstitutional; the courts may quickly remedy this defi-
ciency with a simple procedure. 163
Defendants may also challenge the statute on fairness
grounds, arguing that it operates to admit evidence so prejudi-
cial to their case that the fact-finder can no longer function as a
fair and neutral arbiter, 164 effectively depriving them of their
right to a trial by an impartial jury.165 This line of reasoning
convinced the Tennessee Supreme Court that its child abuse
murder statute violated due process.' 6 6 By basing its decision
on state constitutional grounds, however, the Tennessee court
implicitly indicated that the Federal Constitution does not re-
quire such a result.' 67 Moreover, recent decisions, including the
158. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949); In Re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257, 275 (1948).
159. See Chambers, 309 U.S. at 236-37; JOHN E. NowAK ET AL, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 13.1, at 452 (3d ed. 1986). The Supreme Court has "defined the
category of infractions that violate 'fundamental fairness' very narrowly. Dow-
ling v. U.S., 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). The Fourteenth Amendment incorpo-
rates to the states the provisions of the Bill of Rights that the Court considers
"fundamental" to the system of law. NowAK, supra, § 10.2.
160. See supra note 101 (noting basic due process requirements).
161. 840 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. 1992).
162. Id. at 314.
163. See infra text accompanying notes 177-182.
164. Memorandum of Law, July 16, 1993 at 13, State v. Freeman, 6th Jud.
Dist., St. Louis County, Ct. File No. KF-93-600188 (indicted March 26, 1993);
see Hale, 840 S.W.2d at 313 (concluding that in the highly emotional setting of
the murder trial for a young victim, the fact-finder cannot render an impartial
decision on whether the defendant committed the prior acts of abuse).
165. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Sixth Amendmenfs right
to a trial by an impartial jury to the state courts. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968).
166. Hale, 840 S.W.2d at 313.
167. Id. at 308. The Tennessee Legislature did not repeal the statute, but
rather modified the prior abuse element. TENN. CODE ANN. 39-13-202(a)(4)
(Supp. 1993).
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Supreme Court case, Estelle v. McGuire, have held that admis-
sion of prior act evidence for a proper purpose and according to
established procedures does not, itself, violate the defendant's
right to a fair trial. 168
Generally, two rules of evidence govern the admission of
prior acts evidence at a trial for a current offense: Federal Rules
of Evidence 404(b) and 403 and their state counterparts. Under
rule 404(b), courts may introduce evidence of the defendant's
prior "bad acts" if probative of an important issue of the case. 169
The introduction of the evidence is subject, however, to Rule
403, which excludes otherwise admissible evidence if the danger
of unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value. 170 Defendants
argue that the domestic homicide statute ignores these eviden-
tiary tenets and presumptively admits prejudicial prior acts into
evidence to the detriment of the defendant's due process rights.
The statute is, however, consistent with, and not in opposition,
to established rules of evidence. Properly applied, Minnesota's
statute will not operate to deny a defendant of basic due process
rights to a fair trial.
2. The Statute's Constitutional Fairness
Application of Minnesota's new statute does not violate the
defendants basic due process rights nor does it deny them of
their right to a fair trial.171 The legislature, in enacting the do-
mestic homicide statute, determined that evidence of a "past
pattern of domestic abuse" is a necessary and relevant element
of the offense.' 7 2 This determination is consistent with a long-
accepted practice already implemented in Minnesota courts.
Under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b), the courts, at their
168. 112 S.Ct. 475, 481 (1991); see State v. McCarty, 392 S.E.2d 359, 362
(N.C. 1990) (holding that where defendant had adequate notice of prior acts
evidence and there was a rational connection between the prior act and the
crime for which he was being tried, the court did not violate his due process
rights).
169. FED. R. Evm. 404(b) (1988). Courts may not admit evidence of a de-
fendant's prior bad acts merely to show action in conformity with a specific
character trait, but they may admit prior acts evidence for such purposes as
proving "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident." Id.
170. FED R. Evm. 403 (1988).
171. See supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text (stating the basic fair-
ness requirements under due process).
172. See MIN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (Supp. 1994). The legislature has broad
discretion in defining crimes. See supra notes 98-99 (indicating the deference
courts give to the legislature); supra Part II (lending support to the legislature's
determination).
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discretion, admit evidence of prior acts of abuse in order to es-
tablish a common scheme or plan, to prove intent or absence of
mistake, or to refute the defendant's claim of self defense.'1 3
Courts also can admit prior acts evidence under a Minnesota
statute which creates a presumption of admissibility for prior
acts of domestic abuse.' 7 4 Minnesota courts also admit prior as-
saultive behavior in spousal murder cases to "illuminate" the
victim-defendant relationship. 175 Although consistent with es-
tablished practice, the new homicide statute goes one step fur-
ther; it makes the evidence of prior domestic abuse not simply
relevant, but rather necessary to properly evaluate the defend-
ant's culpability.' 76
While neither the Tennessee statute nor the Minnesota
statute explicitly include a notice requirement for the prior acts
evidence needed to prove the requisite "pattern" element,17 the
courts can easily remedy the deficiency. For example, Minne-
173. See, e.g., State v. Rainer, 411 N.W.2d 490, 497 (Minn. 1987) (using a
"repeating pattern of very similar conduct" to disprove accident); State v. Lang-
ley, 354 N.W.2d 389, 397 (Minn. 1984) (holding that evidence of a prior assault-
ive relationship between husband and wife was not only admissible, but
necessary to explain the victim's injuries when defendant claimed his wife's
death was due to an accidental drowning); State v. Diamond, 241 N.W.2d 95, 99
(Minn. 1976) (admitting eight prior incidents in which the defendant-wife
threatened her decedent-husband with various weapons under the intent and
absence of mistake exceptions); State v. Waukazo, 374 N.W.2d 563, 565 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985) (upholding the admittance of four prior incidents of a husband's
violent behavior toward his estranged wife).
174. M-N. STAT. § 634.20 (Supp. 1994). Although there are no published
opinions using this new statute, it has the potential for expansive application
since, unlike Rule 404(b), it does not require a separate specific purpose for the
admissibility of prior conduct. Compare MIN. STAT. § 634.20 (1988) with
Mn-N. R. Evm. 404(b) (Supp. 1994).
175. State v. Rediker, 8 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Minn. 1943) (holding that evi-
dence of prior bruises and injuries on the 'victim were admissible in conjunction
with the evidence of commotion and noises coming from the couple's apartment
in order to show defendant's "course of conduct" and mental attitude toward his
wife). The state may introduce evidence pertaining to the relationship between
a defendant and a homicide victim, regardless of its reference to another crime.
State v. King, 367 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). The state may also
introduce such evidence for the purpose of "illuminating the relationship" be-
tween the defendant and the victim in order to place the charged incident
within a proper context. See, e.g., State v. Volstad, 287 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Minn.
1980); State v. Currie, 400 N.W.2d 361, 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). In addition,
in order to reconstruct the victim's injuries, the state may introduce evidence of
the defendant's frequent beating of the victim. State v. Broda, 318 N.W.2d 239,
240 (Minn. 1982).
176. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of
the "past pattern" requirement).
177. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(4) (1991) (amended in 1993);
MiNN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (Supp. 1994). The court in State v. Hale specifically
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sota can apply its already well-established procedure for admit-
ting prior acts evidence at trial.'78 Under this procedure, the
state must submit an offer of proof to the court, detailing the
"past pattern" evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 179 The
court must then determine at a pre-trial hearing whether the
state can prove the past incidents with clear and convincing evi-
dence before giving the evidence to a jury. 80 Any evidence that
does not meet the clear and convincing threshold will likely be
excluded under Rule 403.181 At a minimum, use of this proce-
dure as applied to the "past pattern" evidence under the domes-
tic homicide statute provides the defendant with notice and an
opportunity to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.' 8 2
As long as the courts apply a procedure similar to that out-
lined above, the admission of prior acts evidence also does not so
severely prejudice defendants as to deny them of their basic
rights to a fair trial. 8 3 The Supreme Court, in Estelle v. Mc-
Guire, recently addressed the issue of fairness surrounding prior
acts evidence in a child abuse murder trial in California. 84
Although Estelle did not involve a statute like the domestic
homicide statute, the trial court admitted prior injury evidence
in order to show that the killing was intentional.'8 5 The Court
upheld the admission of this evidence as probative of an impor-
tant element of the case and held that it did not deny the defend-
ant of a fair trial.186 Minnesota's domestic homicide statute
gives the defendant even more protection than most existing
noted the absence of a notice requirement in the Tennessee statute. 840 S.W.2d
307, 314 (1992).
178. The seminal Minnesota case, State v. Spreigl, established the proce-
dure necessary for admitting prior acts evidence at trial so as to avoid the "pat-
ent unfairness which results to an innocent defendant who is confronted with
charges against which he is not prepared to defend, which are inflammatory in
the extreme." 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Minn. 1965); see also State v. Matteson,
287 N.W.2d 408, 410-11 (Minn. 1979) (listing six requirements that must be
met to allow admission of prior acts evidence, including notice).
179. See Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d at 169. In Spreigl, the court decided that the
state needs to provide written notice to the defendant, in writing and prior to
the trial, of what offenses it intends to introduce. Id. at 173.
180. E.g., State v. Volstad, 287 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1980); Matteson, 287
N.W.2d at 410-11.
181. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (stating Rule 403's test).
182. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
183. Other states apply similar procedural safeguards in admitting prior
acts evidence. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 565 (Edward W. Cleary
ed., 2d ed. 1984).
184. 112 S.Ct. 475 (1991).
185. Id. at 480.
186. Id. at 480-81.
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prior acts evidence standards187 because it requires the state to
ultimately prove the "past pattern" of abuse beyond a reasonable
doubt. 8
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in State v. Hale, held its
child abuse murder statute unconstitutional without discussing
the statute's procedural application.'8 9 It simply opined that
the highly emotional setting of a trial for the death of a helpless
child would make it impossible for a fact-finder to render an im-
partial decision.' 90 Minnesota, and any other states that adopt
legislation similar to the domestic homicide statute, should not
follow Tennessee's opinion. The Federal Constitution does not
require, 19' and strong policy concerns advocate against,192 such
a decision.
CONCLUSION
Responding to the overwhelming societal problem of domes-
tic violence, the Minnesota legislature enacted a powerful stat-
ute. The statute incorporates important feminist perspectives
into the evaluation of criminal conduct, expanding traditional
notions of mens rea. It recognizes the breach of care and moral
responsibility that underlies a domestic killing and hones in on
the particular experience of the victim and defendant in deter-
mining the severity of the conduct. Although this innovative
statute will be subject to constitutional challenge, it satisfies
specificity and fair trial requirements. Prosecutors should rec-
ognize the valuable contribution of this statute to the criminal
law and begin to use it more aggressively. Moreover, other legis-
latures should look to Minnesota's statute as an example for
similar legislation in their states.
187. MCCORNICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 564 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed.
1984) (noting that the state typically must prove other crimes evidence with
"clear and convincing" evidence).
188. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
189. 840 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. 1992).
190. Id. at 313.
191. The Hale court based its decision on state constitutional grounds. Id.
at 312-13.
192. See supra Part II (discussing the importance of Minnesota's statute).
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